Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Current Youth Bulge in Nepal: Demographic Bonus or Challenge


Abstract:
The central argument of this paper is that Youth Bulge is a transitional phenomenon that appears during the Demographic Transition of any developing country like Nepal. The Youth Bulge should be seen as the interaction of increasing/decreasing ‘fertility’ and ‘mortality’ rates. Considering it as demographic ‘bonus’ or ‘challenge’ require a broad understanding of to what extent the country is expanding its social and economic opportunities.

In doing so, the paper, at first, starts with the concept of youth and youth bulge and positions it to the demographic scenario of Nepal. Secondly, the paper draws understanding of ‘bonus’ side and ‘challenge’ side of Youth Bulge in Nepal through data of National Living Standard Survey, Census Report 2011 and National Population Report 2011 developed by National Planning Commission Secretariat, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and Ministries. Third, it gives synthesis of both the ‘bonus’ side and ‘challenge’ side and finds out the underlying theoretical perspective playing behind the concept of ‘Youth Bulge’.

Finally, the paper concludes that Youth Bulge in Nepal can be either bonus or challenge; however, it depends upon the degree of expansion of social and economic opportunities and the interaction of ‘fertility’ and ‘mortality’ rates.

Key words: Youth, Youth Bulge, Conflict, Bonus, Challenge, Demographic Transition Model (DMT), Remittances, Fertility Rate, Mortality Rate, Social Opportunities

Context:
‘Youth’ is the highly discussed age group in the demographic studies of every country at present.
Policy makers and implementers, throughout the world, have been studying ‘Youth’ population very seriously because of both the benefits and challenges it holds. Demographers, therefore, defines ‘Youth’ in age brackets so as to study its occupancy in the population pyramid and its relations to different demographic variables like poverty, employment, health, etc.

 The age bracket of youth population is different across counties and institutions. United Nations, for instance, considers youth as an age group between16-24; World Bank says it’s within 15-24; in India 13-35 years are considered Youth; Pakistan: 13-35;  Japan: 0-24; and in Nepal, National Youth Policy 2010 suggests it to be within the age bracket of 16-40 years[1].

There are no explicit explanations to the construction basis of these age brackets; however, meanings out of many literatures[2] suggest that the age brackets are constructed to identify the population of the country that mainly undergoes transition from childhood to adolescence and until matured adulthood; and also to respond this age brackets through policies and programs towards  addressing age related issues and seek ways to link this human capital towards development and social change process.

Policy eagles see youth as the cream of all age groups because it is a time of life span where an individual reaches to his/her highest degree of biological (say ‘maturity’, ‘bodily integration’), psychological (say ‘intellectual ability’, ‘thinking’, ‘reasoning’), social (say ‘responsibility’, ‘roles’, ‘values’, ‘marriage’), economical (say ‘income generation’, ‘job’, ‘career’) and every other aspects of life. Moreover, other age categories, mainly child and elderly, are also largely dependent upon this age bracket. In such a scenario, Youth are the drivers of the development of any country and also the integral entries in the demographic listings.

However, Youth are even considered as the most ‘vulnerable group’[3]. The vulnerability of youth-when youth as devils in the demography- is considered to reach its extreme when the growing needs of increasing youth do not satisfy the availability of resources or if the state fails to offer sufficient job opportunities for young people[4]. The devil in them is expected to come out through violence and cases of conflicts. This is generally known as Youth Bulge.

Youth Bulge, as a theory, is considered to have been developed by Gunnar Heinsohn[5], a Genman Sociologist and Economist. According to him, ‘access youth population leads to social unrest, war and terrorism’. Many similar scholars[6] have stated that the situation of Youth Bulge is reflected when 15-24 years age group is above 20 percent of the total population. With an arrival of this theory, many social analysts and demographers started viewing the trends of conflicts all over the world of past decades through Youth Bulge lenses. Safal Ghimire[7] writes in his article[8], “World War I, World War II, Japan's invasion of China, present day Nigeria, Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan are instances to this”. Also, conflict cases of South African country like Republic of Congo, and other territories like Palestine, are even considered to have occurred when the youth population on the respective countries was elevated. These countries have been having tough time to deal with youth and their issues mainly because the increased youth population has exerted pressure on the government and policy makers to expand education, health and employment programs. If government fails to do so, then the youth population is more likely to fall upon conflicts and violence situation which will appear as a serious threat to development and democracy at large.

Discussions of Youth Bulge in Nepal:
In the global scenario, the debate on Youth Bulge took its height after 9/11 incident at United States of America as many scholars tried to find relations of youth and terrorism. Likewise, in Nepal, writers have recently started to link decade long Maoist Conflict with Youth Bulge but in more abstract ways. For instance, C.D Bhatta[9] mentions that the occurrence of Maoist Conflict is because of the failure of the State to address the demands of its youth population. Similarly, Safal Ghimire[10] has also highlighted that, “the demographic phenomena in Nepal with large youth population should be looked in reference to the decade-long Maoist insurgency” in which he has mentioned that the involvement of huge young combatants in the armed conflict critically questioned uneven social, political and economic relations and power structure in the country.    

Furthermore, many political analysts have been seen talking about the possibility of future conflict situation in Nepal after the failure of political parties to draft new constitution and through the advent of culture of militarization from major political parties to their youth wings, for instance, Young Communist League ( Unified Maoist), Youth Force (UML), Madhesi Youth Forum, etc.

However, these writers have not explicitly mentioned about the demographic position of Youth Bulge in Nepal which still put readers into confusion whether youth bulge actually occurs or it is just a cliché; whether youth bulge should be taken seriously like the way conflict specialists and scholars have made it their paradise to over heighten the issue, or it is not much of a problem in case of Nepal and the youth bulge can be considered bonus for development and progress?

 In such circumstances, the paper now attempts to establish demographic position of Youth Bulge in context of Nepal and tries to suggest whether the current youth bulge in Nepal can be considered bonus or challenge. What factors play role in shifting Youth Bulge from bonus side to
challenge side or vice versa? The paper mainly uses the demographic information from NLSS[11] (I, II, III) and Recent Census Report, 2012.

Demographic position of Youth Bulge:
National Youth Policy 2010 of Nepal suggests Youth as an age group falling within the age group of 16-40 which is about 42 percent[12] out of the total population of Nepal. Also, the total population of the age group 16-24 is around 20 percent out of total population. For the time being, this ‘20 percent’ does not seem to be exceeding the general range of the Youth Bulge theory i.e. above 20 percent. However, the population of age groups between 10-14 which is 13.12 per cent and 05-09 years which is 12.10 per cent suggest that until next few decades, still with the annual population growth rate of 1.35 per annum, Nepal is going to have its youth population of age group 16-24 somewhere around 25-26 percent. This clearly confirms the demographic position and current existence of Youth Bulge in Nepal which might remain so until next few decades.

Table 1: Population by  years age group[13]



SOCIAL INDICATORS
Indicator
Year
Result
Year
Result
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
1990/91
97/1000
2006
48/1000
Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR)
1996
539/100 thousand
2010/11
281/100 thousand
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
1996
4.6
2010/11
3.4
Average Life span


2008
64.1

Table 2: Social Indicators[14]

Similarly, the validity of the Youth Bulge in Nepal is even guided by the recent results of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Total Fertility Rate (TFR). Although there is a decline of 1.2 in the TFR from 1996 to 2010/11, however, the decreasing IMR from 97 per thousand during 1990/91 to 48 per thousand infants contributes to population increase too. At the same time, only about 39.1 per cent[15] of couples in Nepal are currently using family planning methods which means still large proportion of couples are either involved in unsafe sexual activities resulting unwanted pregnancies which also contributes to the increasing population.

All in all, with above references, demographic position fulfills the theoretical criteria of Youth Bulge in Nepal not only for now but it is expected to remain so or more until next few decades.

Bonus side:
Having larger youth population is bonus if it can result in the economic growth and prosperity and if there is peaceful political atmosphere. Youth Bulge exists due to the demographic interaction of fertility rates and death/mortality rates. For instance, if there is high fertility rate and lower infant mortality rates then it is sure that the country will see a significant amount of increased youth population later.

However, in order to understand the Youth bulge in Nepal from the bonus side, Demographic Transition Model (DTM)[16] would be helpful. The model describes the changing fertility and mortality situations of country overtime which becomes important to understand the factors behind such demographic changes. The current Youth Bulge is the result of factors affecting the fertility rates and mortality rates.

Figure 1: Demographic Transition Model (DTM)

Nepal Population Report 2011[17] argues that Nepal is in the third stage of the Demographic Transition Model which means both the fertility rate and mortality rate is decreasing. Table 2 (above) shows that both the infant mortality rate and total fertility rate is in decreasing trend.

Variables affecting the decline in fertility rate and mortality rate could be education, health facilities, family planning, increased income, etc. In case of Nepal, the NLSS III report[18] shows positive growth in every variable. For instance, more people are now getting literate as compared. About 56.5 per cent of population of 15 years and above age groups is literate. Now, in every 100 children about 94 have access to primary school. Likewise, people now are healthier than before. About 73.8 per cent of total population has access to health centers. Nepalese children, below five years of age, have very less chances of not being immunized. Only 2.8 percent are not immunized while 97.2 percent children do get immunized fully and partially. In addition, more than half of Nepalese above 10 years of age have heard of HIV/AIDS and people using contraceptives have also increased. The dependency ratio is decreasing from 97 per cent during 1995/96 to 84.4 per cent in 2010/11. Female are also getting more empowered. About 13 per cent increment is seen in the percentage of female headed households which makes 26.6 per cent in 2010/11 compared to 13.5 per cent during 1995/95.  The poverty of the nation has been reduced to 25.2 per cent (2010/11) from that of 41 per cent during 1995/96[19]. At the same time, percentage of unemployment rate is decreasing i.e. from 4.9 during 1995/95 to 2.2 at present; while the percentage of employed population is increasing. In addition, the growing urbanization, new life styles of people, technological penetration, etc have contributed in the declining of fertility rates in response to the declining mortality rate.

These all figures mean that our human capital is now more literate, healthier, have access to facilities, technology, family planning, etc. The shifting from agriculture to non agriculture profession is also starting. For instance, until 1995/96 a household used to have 61 per cent share of its income from agriculture and only 22 per cent from non-farm income. While coming to this date, non-farm income holds the biggest share in household income which is about 37.3 as compared to the income from farm income which is 27.7 percentage of total household income. This means that gradually new sectors of economy, especially public sectors, are developing in Nepal. If Nepal could foster scientific agriculture methods and create of more economic opportunities in non-farm sectors, then the country needs young human capital which comes from the existing youth bulge of Nepal. If in this way, demographic variables are analyzed then Youth Bulge in Nepal can be understood beneficial, and matter of no worry.

Challenge side:
Youth Bulge can also be seen through Challenge side. Unemployment is one of the major sources of conflict among youth within a country. With rising political instability, insecurity, vicious poverty and lack of employment opportunities inside the country, trend of flying abroad for job opportunity among Nepalese Youth has been increased. One in every five members of the family is abroad. The major destinations for these workers are India, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and recently South Korea. Thus, Remittance income has become an important contributor to the current transfers in balance of payment of Nepal, which in recent 2010/11 years is 259 billion (Rs).

Figure 2 Remittances
Initially, the share of remittance to GNP was found 1.74 percent in 1991 which sharply increased to 9.38 percent after 1999. Coming to 2005, it had already reached 12.03 percent of total GNP. According to the recent Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS III), 2010/11 report, about 55.8 percent of households in Nepal receive remittances. These households confirm that about 31 per cent share of their total income lie on remittances. Also, the nominal per capita remittances received for all Nepal is NRs 9245. These facts clearly demonstrate that Remittance, in Nepal, has become the essential and unavoidable source of National income. However, on the other side of this account, there exist effects of remittances in Nepalese economy which are discussed below

First, in case of Nepal, remittances have not been used for capital formation because of which it has no effect on the economic growth. For instance, NLSS III states that the two most reported uses of remittances received are ‘for paying consumption’ and ‘for paying loans’. About 79 percent of the total remittance received by the households is used for daily consumption while 7 percent is used for loan payment. Other uses are to acquire household property (5 percent) and for education (4 percent). Only a small percentage of the remittance (2 percent) is used for capital formation and the remaining (3 percent) is used for other purposes. This clearly suggests that remittances in Nepal are generally not intended to serve as investments. Rather, they are used as social insurance to help family fulfill their basic necessities that include household consumption. 

Second, another possible effect of huge remittances inflow is on the trade sector. For instance, although the main sector of our economy is agriculture, however, we have not been able to raise our domestic production. One of the reasons for this is because there is shortage of labor force in agriculture and industries because of foreign employment. Unable to increase domestic production means insufficient to satisfy domestic demand and need to import more foreign goods. Therefore, more import results trade deficit. The shortage of labor increase labor costs and ultimately cost of production and makes our products less competitive. This will again unwontedly encourage us to import more.

Third, remittances reduce labor market participation rate because the transfer-receiving families become more dependent on remittances and prefer living idle lives. For instance, according to the NLSS III report, the third most important reason for being economically inactive is being engaged in household duties, which accounts for 27.8 percent of total population (and 39.7 percent of inactive females).

Fourth, remittances are even seen through lenses of ‘brain-drain’- loss of human resources because of migration, and ‘brain-gain’- return of migrants. Brain gain is considered beneficial for development. Separately, foreign labor also invites social problems (human costs), for instance, transfer of HIV/AIDS, family disintegration and separation, depression, etc.
Although Remittances from youth population has helped to make Nepalese economy survive, however, it might not last long because foreign markets are also not stable in present context. Also, since the money that Nepalese youth sends does not get much into saving and does not generate further wealth, frustration and depression might occur among youth when they arrive back home. At such a situation, when the state fails to address them through new job opportunities, then chances of conflict occurrence gets maximum which possesses serious threat to current progress that Nepal has made in terms of development and democracy.


Inference
The synthesis of two aspects of Youth Bulge: Bonus or Challenge as discussed in the earlier sections provides meaningful reflections. First, the expansion of facilities like education, health, employment determines the increase or decrease among two major variables fertility rates and mortality rates. The interaction of these two determines the increase or decrease in the percentage of Youth Bulge. Understanding Youth Bulge through the lenses of DTM gives us an idea that Youth Bulge is just a transition within the Demographic transition[20] of any country. It does not remain long under strict and continuous expansion of social opportunities[21].

In contrary, if state fails to expand social and economic opportunities, then the increasing youth population, Youth Bulge- which appears as a result of decreasing phenomenon of both fertility and mortality rates in a developing country- is sure to create pain in neck for the leaders, state, policy makers and concerned authorities. The Youth Bulge under such circumstances has high chances of falling into conflict and violence activities.

This synthesis put forwards two paths: either keep on expanding social and economic opportunities or face conflicts. However, in both of these paths, the politics of ‘fertility’ and ‘mortality’ rates perform judgments. Since the relation of fertility and mortality shown by the DTM predicts changes, which might occur especially in the developing countries in the light of the experience of the developed countries[22], it can therefore be concluded that the outside the box  theoretical framework is modernization theory[23].

Conclusion:
Youth Bulge, in case of Nepal, can be either demographic bonus or challenge. The existence of Youth Bulge in Nepal is depending upon the fertility and mortality rates while its impacts as ‘bonus’ or ‘challenge’ is depending upon the extent Nepal has been successful to expand its social and economic opportunities which would meet the demands and needs of young people. Since less social and economic opportunities create more conflict situation and vice versa. In bigger picture, the role of the leaders, demographers and policy makers in Nepal should be on decreasing both fertility and mortality rates. This would ultimately separate the young population from falling into the trap of Youth Bulge and avoids conflict situations at large.





[1] Reading materials : National Youth Policy of India, Pakistan and Nepal; United Nation’s document on ‘How Youth can engage in the UN’ and World Bank website; Youth Studies Course Booklet of YUWA (www.yuwa.org.np)
[2] Emmanuel Y. Jimenez and Mamta Murthi, 2006, Investing in the Youth Bulge, September 2006,  (43) 3 published by International Monetary Fund, http://bit.ly/mOumht;
K.C, Brabim, 2010, o'jf pd]/ lgwf{/0f ;DaGwdf g]kfn o'jf ;+:yf ;~hfndf k|:t't k|ltj]bg (Unpublished);
Simkhada, Dhruba/ Nepal, Kiran, 2008 B.S.  x] o'jf, x] o'jf, x] o'jf Himal Khabar Patrika, Kartik 1-30, 2064;
Basu, Kaushik, Hyejin Ku, and Homa Zarghamee. 2006. " Determinants of Youth Behavior and Outcomes: A review of Theory Evidence and Policy Implications." Background paper for the WDR 2007.
[3] Youth Policy Formulation Manual, United Nations, 1995
[4] Henrik Urdal, “The Devil in Demographics: the effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict 1950-2000”, The World Bank
[6] Read in Asia Changing Youth Population
[7] Safal Ghimire is a Research Officer (Conflict and Economy), Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, South Asia Office.
[8] A Vibrant but Volatile Force: Youths in Social Conflict (www.iyd.org.np)
[9] See “Youth Bulge”, an article published on Kathmandu Post on April 6, 2011 (http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/04/05/oped/youth-bulge/220267.html)

[10] A Vibrant but Volatile Force: Youths in Social Conflict (www.iyd.org.np)
[11] National Living Standard Survey (NLSS); I refers to that of 1995/96, II refers to that of 2003/04 and III refers to that of 2010/11
[12] National Report Census of Population and Housing  2011, Nepal (Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (http:/www.cbs.gov.np)

[13] National Report Census of Population and Housing 2011
[14] Recent report of CBS regarding its say on measuring poverty.

[15] National Planning Commission Secretariat, CBS, “National Living Standard Survey (NLSS III), 2011, Early findings”
[16]Developed in 1919 by the American demographer Warren Thompson (see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition). This model has mainly four stages: The first stage (both fertility and mortality rates high); second stage (mortality declines while fertility remains more or less constant); third stage (fertility and mortality both declines); fourth stage (fertility and mortality are quite close)
[17] See: Nepal Population Report 2011, Government of Nepal, Ministry of Health and Population, Population Division. This report is based upon the population census 2001 and other related surveys.
[18] National Planning Commission Secretariat, CBS, “National Living Standard Survey (NLSS III), 2011, Early findings”
[19] Kanchan Pd. Kharel, “Has democracy been successful to reduce poverty in Nepal”, Article published in Human Rights Monitor, 2012.
[20] Demographic transition (DT) refers to the transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates as a country develops from a pre-industrial to an industrialized economic system. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition)
[21] Amartya Sen in his book ‘Development as Freedom’ has highlighted the importance of ‘social opportunities’. He explains the creation of social opportunities is important for countries, especially those which are looking for development, in order to achieve development through rapid economic growth. The creation of opportunities includes services as public education, health care, and the development of a free energetic press  (Sen, 2000)
[22] As cited in  Nepal Population Report 2011, Government of Nepal, Ministry of Health and Population, Population Division. This report is based upon the population census 2001 and other related surveys.

[23] Modernization theory suggests that the progress of underdeveloped countries can be accelerated through contact with developed ones. (see Amulya Tuladhar powerpoint presentation on Introduction to Development Studies)


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